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The answer is "no." The textbooks of international law which I have looked into are curiously silent about the fact—known to all historians and observers of affairs—that spying on each other and secret efforts to influence each other are the ancient and universal practice of great states. There is in international relations a public world and there is also an underworld. The relationship between the public world and the underworld—between the governments in office and the spies, has never been codified.

But there have developed certain rules—a kind of common law—and one of these rules is that if a spy is caught, he is discovered and left to his fate. This, by the way, was the rule that President Eisenhower violated in the U-2 affairs. Another rule is that the secret operation must remain secret in the sense that it remains invisible that it is never acknowledged its failures are never explained and its successes are never celebrated.

This is a limiting rule for a wide open democracy like our own. It means that while clandestine help can be given in the Cuban underground an operation of the type and character of the Cuban invasion must be undertaken. As affecting the United States there is no great difference between what is feasible in practice and what is permissible in law. It was not feasible to overthrow Castro with 1400 rifles, and it was unlawful to attempt it, but it is feasible, and in the practice of states it is not prohibited to give clandestine help, so long as it remains clandestine, to Castro's opponents. So while the rule of law does not have to be obeyed absolutely and literally, the rule of law must not be broken flagrantly and defied publicly.

#### IMPORTANCE OF U.S. SUPPORT OF MOVEMENTS OF SOCIAL CHANGE

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the Record an article entitled "The Polly of Despair," written by Walter Lippmann.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

##### THE POLLY OF DESPAIR (By Walter Lippmann)

We have had a run of bad news and the time has come when we must make up our minds whether to face it and learn from it, or to shrink from it into a nervous breakdown with suicidal tendencies. There are altogether too many of us who in dismay and disappointment are ready to admit that Khrushchev is right in predicting that communism is sweeping the world and that, sort of war, we have no means of stopping it.

They are like the man who, as an experienced diplomat once put it many years ago, is so worried that he will fall off the top floor of the Empire State Building that he stops the elevator and jumps out of the ninth floor window. I believe this defeatism to be profoundly mistaken and unwarranted. It is based on a misreading and a misunderstanding of what has happened since the second World War and what is happening now. The root of the error is to equate, instead of to differentiate between, the Communist movement which owes allegiance to Moscow and Peking and the worldwide movements of social reform and social revolution, which almost everywhere seek national independence and nonalignment with the great powers.

Mr. Khrushchev's hope and belief is that we will lead and direct all the reforming and revolutionary movements. We play right into his hands when we identify ourselves

with the opponents of change rather than with the leaders of change.

For those who think that Laos and south-east Asia are gone and that like the dominoes all the Asian nations and the Pacific will go too, I should like to call attention to Egypt. It was not so many years ago—in fact it was in 1888—when we were told that Egypt and Syria and Iraq, and all the oil of the Persian Gulf, and the Suez Canal, were gone or going. Egypt had gotten arms from Czechoslovakia, it got Soviet help in building the Aswan Dam, it nationalized the Suez Canal, and all was lost.

Yet look at it now. Syria and Iraq and the Persian Gulf States are not Communist. Egypt continues to put its Communists in jail. Mr. Khrushchev has attacked Egypt publicly. President Nasser is calling a congress of the neutrals who do not take their direction from Moscow. Egypt has played a decisive part in preventing the flow of Soviet arms to the rebels in the Congo.

After Egypt and the Middle East, look at Africa, look at Guinea, which 6 months ago was written off as gone. It is not gone despite the several hundred Soviet technicians who are there. Probably it is not gone in part at least because the Soviet technicians who are there have made themselves so unpopular. In any event the chances are good that Guinea in the end will line up with the rest of independent Africa as a neutral state.

There is now a great likelihood that the whole of North Africa, all the way from Morocco to Egypt, will take a neutral line, refusing to be dominated by Moscow or to take direction from Paris or Washington.

Moreover, I do not believe that Cuba is gone, and I have a very strong impression that Mr. Khrushchev does not begin to think Cuba is as gone as, let us say, Senator SMATHERS thinks it is. For Cuba is as far from Moscow as Laos is from Washington. In time, not necessarily in a very long time, the Cuban revolution will rejoin the community of American states. It will do so because it has no other place to go.

The wave of the future is not Communist domination of the world. The wave of the future is social reform and social revolution driving toward the goal of national independence and equality of peoples' status. In this historical tendency Khrushchev will be, as Mr. Alsop tells me, is supposed to have described himself, "the locomotive of history," only if we ourselves up to be the roadblocks of this tendency.

What is the lesson of all these experiences? At bottom the lesson is that there is no social upheaval which the Communists not create but which they hope to control. If we make our own policy one of opposition to this worldwide movement of change, we shall lose the cold war. Mr. Khrushchev's hopes will be realized. On the other hand, we befriend the movement with active measures the social and political change, their leaders will be subordinated to Moscow because they do not have to mit to Moscow. They do not wish to mit to Moscow because what they want is independence.

#### SOME REFLECTIONS UPON RECENT EVENTS AND CONTINUING TRENDS

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Madam President, for the past 2 months the attention of the world has been directed to a series of dramatic events. In the process, a great many Americans have been shocked, confused, and frustrated by the unmistakable blows to the prestige of the United States. First, a Soviet satellite orbited the earth in a space of a few

Then came the misadventure in Cuba. This was quickly followed by a further decline in the Laos situation, which has set the stage for what may be an unhappy development to that affair.

On the heels of these events, there has emerged another Berlin crisis, one that probably is more serious than any of its predecessors. I do not now intend to explore the elements of the Berlin situation. It is at this moment under the most serious study by this Government and our European allies.

My fear is that many Americans, including some whose judgment is generally good, are drawing the wrong conclusions from the earlier events I mentioned. From the Soviet space achievement, they conclude that we must dramatically expand our man-in-space program, whatever the cost. The lesson of Cuba, they suggest, is that the objective was the correct one, but that the means employed were inadequate. And they further suggest that any means by which we can block Communist encroachment in our hemispheric garden is the proper course of action. From the events in Laos, many of these voices argue that a political settlement in the present circumstances will simply yield up another country to communism; that we must prevent with any available means the formation in Laos of a government that includes Communist participation.

What these voices are saying is that the United States is the strongest country in the world, and should not hesitate to commit its strength to the active defense of its policies anywhere outside the Communist empire. This is dangerous doctrine; nothing would please Communist leaders more than to draw the United States into costly commitments of its resources to peripheral struggles in which the principal Communist powers are not themselves directly involved.

As a Nation, we are understandably prone to be more responsive to dramatic events than to the hard, continuing struggle itself. This is a susceptibility that is common to free societies, but much less a problem to totalitarian societies. As a Nation, we are a ruggedly pragmatic people, accustomed to disposing of problems swiftly and resolutely. Yet it may be that the simple trial and error methods that accompanied our growth are not relevant to our present role as defenders of Western civilization.

As leader, we must recognize that the struggle with our Communist adversary has entered a critical phase. Our policy has been steadily receding over the past several years. We can no longer afford errors. Henceforth, we must endow our actions with greater wisdom, judgment, and consistency than has been the case in recent years. This is a large task. We are caught up in a swirl of events. Wisdom and judgment derive from reflective thought. It is difficult to bring these qualities to bear on events that often develop with bewildering speed. The answer, of course, is policy. We must develop policies against which we can properly evaluate our initiatives and our responses to critical events. We